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1953

A concept of command management.

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<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/31021>



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A CONCEPT OF
COMMAND MANAGEMENT

Term report
Submitted by:

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May 7, 1953

PREFACE

The objective of this paper is to examine certain management aspects inherent in the billet of the Commanding Officer of a U.S.Navy ship. On the face of the undertaking, this may appear superfluous since basic the regulations of the U.S.Navy spell out the absolute responsibility of the Commanding Officer towards the efficient and effective and economical operation of his command, and the U.S.Navy Regulations are supplemented by voluminous directives from each level of command senior to the Commanding officer.

The basic and amplifying directives pertain largely to the assignment of the responsibility, however, and within limitations of conformity set patterns of accomplishment in certain instances. The method of general implementation is left to the individual. This paper then, will serve as an examination of methodology to a limited degree, and to recognize certain generally overlooked possibilities in the execution of the assigned duties.

-I- BILLET OF COMMANDING OFFICER

Responsibilities of command can be the subject of volumes of instructions, directives, and well-meant advice and libraries have been founded and maintained in pursuit of definitive and precise containment of the field. By derivation from, and development of fairly broad sections of U.S. Navy Regulations, 1948, it is common to find precise statements concerning the commanding officer's responsibility towards such minute items as routine maintenance of anchor engines and the numbers of pairs of socks which each seaman must possess.

This examination is intended, however, to pursue the broader interpretation of the responsibility of the commanding officer for the leadership of his command as a whole.

The basic philosophy controlling the conduct of the office of command in the U.S. Navy is centered on the concept of impersonality within the office, and the service accepts its leadership by the example and personal standards of the incumbent of the office. This philosophy has been unconsciously developed on somewhat the same basis as the standardization and interchangeability of parts in the products of American industry. Standardization has been the underlying principle which has permitted the rapid progress in the industrialization of the nation during this century. Similarly, the philosophy of command permits interchangeability of commanding officers and frequent turnover in the office does not disrupt the functioning of the command to any appreciable

extent.

The relative degree of effectiveness of performance of the command depends in a large measure upon the example set by the commanding officer. Dynamic personality and ability within the individual usually result in greater effectiveness in the performance of the command than is obtained by the leadership of a more placid officer. The resultant effectiveness is purely relative and is measured only above the level of satisfactory results. This represents only the secondary trend which is superimposed upon the predicated primary trend of success that is inherent in the impersonality of the office. Minor trends will be dependant upon the seriousness and degree, as well as the periodicity, of the checks and inspections of the status and progress of the command towards the achievement of the set objectives which the commanding officer conducts.

A comparison might be accomplished if one could consider a basic and minimum success pattern as represented by the tides of the ocean. No matter what might occur, tidal action and success or minimum effectiveness in command is assured. Waves are superimposed upon tides, and yet more minor action is caused by winds and currents, but these secondary and minor actions or trends serve only to amplify preponderously, or negate to a minor degree, the primary tidal action. So, likewise, does the personality of the commanding officer blend itself with the inherent impersonality of the basic office.

The standards of success and effectiveness of command can be

no different from those of the personal standards of the commanding officer. It is he who must set the tone of the performance of the command. It may be expected that the ultimate performance standards of the command will be closely akin to the natural personal standards of the commanding officer, and his superficial standards or desires will have but little effect in the end. The commanding officer with the highest degree of personal integrity and highest level of professional ethics will receive the highest degree of loyalty from his command; and the commanding officer who has additionally developed the art of delegation of responsibility and has developed organizational ability is the one who will have, inevitably, the most effective command.

Invariably, the command of this officer will also be the one in which there is the least amount of tension and indecision, and the one in which the most internal confidence is found. Inspiration of subordinates is infectious and strong leadership possesses a quality of natural permeation downwards. This permeation requires firm guidance, however, in order to assure no occurrence of misfeasance or non-feasance due to overenthusiasm on the part of the juniors.

There is no doubt but what the success pattern of command is somewhat complicated by the instability and insecurity of the times in which we are presently living. On one hand we have a world in which undeclared wars are the order of the day, and new international tensions are continuous expectations. Each new incident between the dominant conflicting ways of world life

underlines the necessity for the permanent maintenance of maximum combat efficiency in each command. The proper utilization of the expenditure of nervous energy which is continuously under generation with the presence of these conditions is a prime responsibility of the commanding officer so long as the conditions exist.

On the other hand, the economy of the nation cannot long support the extravagances which war-conditions and pseudo war-conditions foster in the maintenance of the military. Recognition of this principle is the constant demand of the Congress and the Public which the Congress represents. Lip-service will not be tolerated and only the strictest interpretation of rules and regulations borne from the economy-trained mind will suffice as the minimum requirement of the commanding officer. His solutions must include manpower and material as well as financial resources in order to qualify as satisfactory answers to his problems.

Predictions of the foreseeable future indicate that the military will have increasingly difficult problems in obtaining operating funds, ships, equipment, and manpower. The keys to the problems will lay with the individual commanding officers upon whom the responsibilities for the ultimate expenditures of the manpower, material, and financial resources of the military are placed. The commanding officers of the ships of the Navy bear these responsibility for the afloat element of the naval service.

The commanding officer afloat plays very little part in

the determination of the requirements of the services relative to the solution of the overall defense problem of the nation. His position is not one which considers the strategic or tactical aspect of national policies, nor is he one who must defend the needs of the services before the Congress. Once the breadth of the national policy is determined by the executive branch of the government, and financed by the legislative branch, the commanding officer afloat is assigned the responsibility of producing the most effective unit possible within the limitations of the resources assigned. Sufficient resources are invariably assigned his command to assure minimum success to his mission. Foresight and superior planning ability on his part, and a display of the leadership qualities previously described, will produce the maximum in effectiveness. Should the level produced be then above that which is necessary to assure the general welfare of the country, resources available to the commanding officer could be reduced by his superiors if requirements dictated and the resources made available elsewhere wherein the need might be vital in the solution of the overall national defense problem.

Because his financial problems are largely solved at Bureau level the average commanding officer gains little appreciation for the monetary value of his resources during his years at sea. "Cost-unconsciousness" rather than the desired reverse, is fostered by the present systems of resources supply. On a relative basis, the monetary allotments which a ship receives are of but little consequence in the comparison of actual monetary costs of oper-

ation. Comparison of costs in terms of manpower, material, or other yardstick, is not made as a normal procedure.

II FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE NAVY AFLOAT

The lack of appreciation of operational costs of the Navy afloat are spread more widely than the sole province of the Commanding Officer. Cost figures are available, but little or no use is made of them to present a correlated picture to the operating personnel. Each and every commanding officer should be thoroughly conversant with the capitalization of his business enterprise, and familiar with the operating costs thereof. Table I presents a summary of such data for two combatant type ships as well as one amphibious and one auxiliary type. A study of the figures presented therein would indicate that the average ship afloat represents a business within itself of larger magnitude than the average commercial undertaking. For comparative purposes, the average destroyer represents a capital investment equivalent to that of the ABUNDOL CORPORATION of Baltimore, Maryland, one of the country's largest marine construction firms. The destroyer represents an original capital outlay of \$9,505,000 and requires an average of \$1,450,000 for annual operating expenses.

Realization of these financial figures leads one to the conclusion that the U.S. Navy, in aggregate, is larger than any single business enterprise of the nation.

It is probable that the underlying reason for the lack of appreciation of the financial aspects of the operation of afloat commands by their officers is that profits of the military enterprise are not measured in financial terms, as would be the case

in the comparative business undertaking. In the world of business, ultimate effectiveness of management is judged by the financial yardstick, and the management so ineffectual as to produce a loss, or even a low standard of profit in the face of advantageous conditions, must expect to be short-lived.

The profit standards of the Navy must be measured in the terms of ultimate contribution to the mission of the organization to which the unit belongs. Individually, this can be reduced, in terms of the single ship, to a measure of the overall effectiveness of the command in its contribution. The yardsticks of comparison must be in the economical usage, maintenance, and development of its manpower, materiel, and financial resources in that descending order. Since these standards are multiple in nature, they place a more complicated responsibility upon the commanding officer and his assisting subordinates, than would be commonly found in the comparable commercial situation.

In previous years, the financial aspects of command have received very little emphasis with the resultant condition that little or no appreciation has been developed for the importance of this phase. Likewise, the availability of manpower has been of very little concern to the commanding officer. His primary concern has been in the development of the quality of manpower necessary to operate and maintain his command, for the quality supplied to him has always been inferior to the level that the commanding officer would normally desire.

The extravagance with which the military is generally

credited can be partially blamed to the lack of training in financial thinking and the lack of immediately available correlated financial data to the individual commanding officer. The education level, general personal characteristics, and ability of the commanding officers of our Navy being at least equal to those of their counterparts in American business, it is reasonable to assume that they are capable of adjusting their decisions to include more thoughtful consideration of financial aspects, if that necessary data were made continuously available to them in useful form.

Regardless of the unavailability of the general fiscal presentation, it is incumbent upon the commanding officer afloat to develop these thinking habits, and to instill in his subordinates sufficient confidence by his example upon which to base their own expansion of cost-consciousness. It is a further requirement that the commanding officer insist that every decision be examined in each of the aspects of the economy, and establish efficient levels of performance in consequence of these examinations.

IV DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

In acceptance of the absolute responsibility for the performance of his command, the commanding officer obligates himself to produce an efficient management of the command. To this end, the commanding officer is the "top management" of the command, and in recognition thereof, the U.S.Navy Regulations afford the commanding officer suitable prerogatives. The regulations also stipulate the minimum extent of responsibility delegation downwards to the level of Heads of Departments which he must implement. It is well recognized that much more than regulations is required to coordinate the efforts of a command, and it is therein that the commanding officer becomes a true manager.

Delegation of responsibilities cannot be successfully accomplished without the simultaneous delegation of compensatory authority. In so far as is practical, the delegations of responsibility and authority should be reduced to writing in order to assure complete understanding of the limitations intended.

Further, the aggregate of the delegated responsibility must be examined against the defined mission of the command in order to assure fulfillment of the mission. This is best accomplished by establishing an operating plan for the guidance of the command and against which the examination of the aggregate can be made. Once this examination is satisfactorily completed, supervision of the command reduces itself to the relatively simple task of inspections and checks to assure maintenance of the prescribed

standards and performance quality.

It is axiomatic that delegated responsibilities and resultant tasks must be within the capabilities of the men to whom they are assigned. The capabilities of the individuals of the command must be assessed and a constant program of evaluation of the capabilities of groups must be maintained as the training of groups progresses.

The corollary to this axiom is that the full capabilities of the available manpower must be utilized. Non-utilization to the fullest extent invariably results in a continual lowering of morale level, as well as a wastage of manpower resources. Full utilization of capabilities not only fosters a high degree of self-satisfaction amongst men individually thus becoming the firm basis upon which to build ever-increasing level of high morale within a command, but it also reduces manpower requirements numerically.

The establishment of a comprehensive record for each officer and enlisted man within the command is a prerequisite to full capability utilization. The record system must be simple, easily workable, and available to all management levels within the limits of manpower assigned to them. Further, it must be based upon realistic evaluation of the individual. Such a record system will become invaluable to the successful management of the command.

IV ORGANIZATIONAL HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS

The commanding officer of an afloat command inherits from his predecessor an organization which has been developed from a combination of time honored naval experience and directives of the basic U.S. Navy Regulations. The regulation book dictates certain minimum organizational patterns, and type commanders have amplified the minimum pattern to the extent of rigidity. There being no option in the matter of organization pattern left to the commanding officer (without a process the length of which is commensurate with the degree of desired change), there is generally very little interest displayed in the other factors of importance to organizational planning.

The lack of interest is abetted by the fact that personnel assignment to the command is achieved by the process of detailing an officer or man in accordance with vacancies in the allowance list. The allowance list of the ship is based upon the degree of technical knowledge required to operate the various components of the ship, and in theory, were each billet filled by a man possessing exactly the required qualifications prescribed for that billet, the ship would be manned at the minimum level needed for efficient operations. Too often, the commanding officer finds himself faced with a crew which is woefully inadequate in technical qualifications in some specialties, but numerically sufficient as a whole.

It is with this situation that the organizational ability

of the commanding officer is of great importance. In an organization as closely knit as that of a shipboard command, compatibility is essential. Men work, eat, and sleep in much closer proximity than would be normal in a civilian pursuit. Steadiness and maturity of judgement are also prime requisites. It is therefore important that each man be evaluated against his assigned billet requirements to assure maximum performance of the unit with a minimum of friction development and resultant discontent.

This aspect of organization requires that job analyses be prepared, and realistically assessed. The validity of tasks must be assured and work not essential to the fulfillment of the mission must be eliminated. Very often, preparation of job analyses and validation thereof is ignored in the afloat command.

Comparison of the job analyses and the qualifications of available personnel then form a basis upon which realistic training programs can be established. The theory that the Bureau of Personnel and the Service Commands provide the command with adequate personnel to meet the requirements of the command as represented by the allowance list must be accepted by the type commander and the Navy as a whole. Without acceptance of this theory, standards of performance would be based upon the lesser capabilities and would be wholly inadequate to the needs of the service. The only acceptable solution lay in the recognition that this assumption is valid in theory only and places the incumbency of development of the individuals upon the commanding officer. The need of training programs is well recognized, but too often

the program is not predicated upon the needs of the individual and thus valuable time and effort is wasted in needless repetition and duplication of training.

Inadequate performance by the individual is frequently blamed upon his lack of qualifications, and the Bureau of Personnel and the Service Force is criticized for the assignment of that individual to the command. Too often the true responsibility for poor performance lay within the command and can be traced to inadequate supervision. Continuous supervision must be provided at all levels and the commanding officer must be active in the leadership of this element of the organizational performance of the command. He must be active in the training of his supervisors in the factor of group leadership and the establishment and maintenance of proper staffing ratios of supervisors to workmen within the command.

The factor of inspection in organizational performance is misunderstood very often. There is a definite art of inspection. To successfully develop that art there must be recognition of the psychological aspect that a sailor or officer is entitled to an inspection by his superiors, and that a successful passage of the inspection is recognition of satisfaction with the level of performance of the individual; and more important to the individual, satisfaction or pleasure if such is expressed, with his personal ability and progress. Subordinates have the right to expect that their work will be inspected, and too often, inspections are perfunctory and stand as unpleasant tasks to the inspector and

inspectee alike.

The commanding officer must not assume that each officer and man fully understands the inter-relationship of the various departments and divisions of the command. These relationships are covered in the indoctrination schedule of any ship, but assurance must be obtained that there is full appreciation of the objectives of the command and its components in order to be sure of intelligent application of effort either by an individual or by a group within the command. This understanding is basic to the acceptance of the principle of organizational and human relationships throughout the command.

The degree of acceptance of organizational and human relationships can be easily determined aboard a ship. Living conditions are such as to be conducive to early recognition of signs of internal strife and friction. As the command gets larger and personal contact with lower level subordinates becomes less frequent, the commanding officer must place more dependance upon his key subordinates in this respect. This dependance can only assist and not replace the commanding officer's own observations, however.

Promotion of human relations in an organization reduces itself in some respect to the promotion of teamwork within the command and the components thereof. The commanding officer who becomes the head coach and is assisted in the coaching functions by his heads of departments is the officer who has recognized human relations as a major aspect of command.

Obviously, the commanding officer must be discreet in introducing changes within a command, particularly if a change is to be made within the organizational relationships of the command. He must assure himself that the full implications of the change are well understood and accepted as desirable, or possibly he will find an untenable dissatisfaction which so often breeds uncooperative attitudes. In a ship, officers and sailors alike have an intense personal interest in their jobs which must be recognized. There is not one who is not interested in the operating efficiency of the ship, and in the competence of his immediate leader. The underlying basis for this interest is his personal knowledge that upon the efficiency of the ship and the quality of leadership which he provides and is provided to him his life might eventually depend. This knowledge is inherent and because it is not close to the surface of the individual, it is not often the source of thought by him. The apparent reason for his intense interest is comparatively more superficial; it comprises the interest that one normally has in his home, food, and recreation. Changes which effect the individual and are not understood by him produce an undesirable and emotional impact.

Basically, the organization of a ship is not an impersonal entity. The commanding officer must fit the human element to the organization, or compensate for the area of difference between the capabilities required by the organizational pattern and those present in the crew provided to him. The blending of the human relationships with the established organizational pattern

is basic to a satisfactory level of organizational performance.

V ORGANIZATION CHARTS

The commanding officer has a most effective device for testing the theoretical efficiency of an organization and for predicting the probable quality of end product of his command. This device is the organization chart. Because of inexperience in the use of charts and their capabilities, the average officer is reluctant to expend much effort in their production. In order to be of practical value, the chart must be constructed in such a manner as to show, factually, where authority and responsibility really are located. The factual chart in which the organizational information is readily discernable, is most useful. However, the presence of theoretical assignment of responsibility in one area when the actual exercise of the commensurate authority is far removed, invalidates the chart for accurate usage.

By using the chart, lines of communication and delegation of responsibility become visual and valuable aids in the elimination of unnecessary duplication of effort. The relationships between associated task assignments are evident, and the chart thus becomes an assurance that other interested work areas have been consulted in the solution of a problem and further, it assures that no department with a possible overlapping interest has been eliminated from a problem because of unilateral action.

Organization charts should be prepared, published, and understood by the entire command. These charts should not only indicate lines of authority and responsibility, but lines of

communication as well. Separate charts should be prepared detailing the functions of each unit of the command in order that positive control can be maintained over ever-present tendencies to duplicate work. A functional chart, prepared in a cryptic form and easily understood serves this purpose very well.

Such permanent references assist every member of a command, and the best efforts of the command should be expended in their preparation and continuous maintenance. Organization charts are comparable to the blueprints used in the construction of a machine. They are the blueprints of the command, and the quality of their preparation reflects itself within the organization in the same manner as blueprints reflection would appear in the machine.

The use of charts in combination with job descriptions to depict the location of primary responsibility of unit leadership eliminates sources of potential misunderstanding and provides a readily accessible reference or source of public knowledge as to whom criticism or praise is due for the quality of results produced. If there is wide knowledge at levels junior to him of the fact that a responsibility is assigned to a man, he will exert much stronger efforts towards the successful accomplishment of the project than if the fact were unpublished.

VI SUPERVISION

The problem of maintenance of adequate supervision is always one confronting the commanding officer, particularly one new to the position. There are definite tendencies toward the payment of abnormal amounts of attention to a relatively few areas of the command to the exclusion of the remainder. This sometimes stems from the lack of, or presence of, previous experience in certain fields of endeavor and the division of the commanding officers time may be the unconscious product of his feeling of inadequacy or expertness in the affected fields. It is important that the commanding officer give equal attention and behaviour to all parts of his command studiously. In this manner only can the feeling of partiality be eliminated.

Equality of attention to all units of the command assures the commanding officer that opportunities are being created continuously for those officers and men with assigned responsibilities to have access to him and his time. The concept that the commanding officer is a valuable resource to his subordinates is developed, and his assistance in aiding subordinates to make decisions bestows confidence in the officer or man involved in his own ability to perform to the satisfaction of his superiors. The commanding officer who leaves the impression that decisions have been developed and rendered by the subordinate rather than by himself is creating a source of future time for himself which otherwise might have to be expended in further detailed

supervision of the thinking of the subordinate. His objective should be the training of his subordinates to receive delegated authority and responsibility and to make decisions for themselves.

This involves continuous inspection and informal observation of all departments and divisions of the command. Invariable, the most important departments of the command are assigned to officers with the most effective experience and ability in the field of their departmental activity. Functions of lesser importance are generally assigned to officers with little experience, with the consequence that the time of the commanding officer in the supervision of the less significant functions is often disproportionate to the relative importance of the activity. Compensation is found in the seasoned ability of the more experienced officers who head the departments of greater importance. In this manner, the commanding officer can, with clear conscience, spend equal amounts of time with all activities of his command.

The development of the assistants to the heads of departments and division leaders is a task of great importance. The heads of departments must be encouraged by the example of the commanding officer to delegate the responsibilities further, to develop in their assistants the capacity to receive responsibility, and ability to work with others.

One of the overlooked objectives of command supervision, is the creation of future time for the commanding officer. The availability of time is of major importance for the successful accomplishment of his assigned task--the management of the ship

and crew entrusted to his care. He must have freedom to act, and can obtain that freedom only by creating the time as a result of mutual confidence instilled by carefully planned supervision of the command.

VII MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY

Previous reference has been made to the measurement of profit in the afloat command. It is measured primarily by the degree that men and material are used effectively, economically, and wisely. Secondarily, the measurement of effective usage of financial resources is indicative of the profit standards, but since the commanding officer afloat has so little control over the usage of the financial resources of the Navy, this measurement is of lesser significance on a relative basis. The commanding officer controls only the items, "Miscellaneous Supplies and Equipage", and "Subsistence" shown in Table I, although he has some influence over the expenditures of the other monies.

Too often however, the factor of economical usage of manpower and material is over-looked since the commanding officer does not directly control the expenditure of funds for payroll, fuel, ammunition, or repairs. There being no convenient yardstick available for costing an operation in financial terms, the unit of manpower remains financially unvalued in planning and executing a routine task. Lack of similar convenient yardsticks affects planning and execution of operations using fuel and ammunition. The integration of cost yardsticks must be accomplished in the determination of economical usage. Material as well as manpower can be used effectively but uneconomically in terms of financial costs. The element of wisdom and judgement must be included in the overall planning for manpower and material

expenditures. When these elements have been properly balanced, optimum results can be anticipated.

The profit standards of the command must be set by the commanding officer in the absence of definable standards from superiors. Whether prescribed for, or developed by the commanding officer, the standards should be reduced to manageable form and the usage of the standards required.

The problem of economical usage of manpower cannot be approached from the costing viewpoint only. The utilization of capabilities, experience, and quality of manpower available must also be evaluated. Examination of work programs and schedules would produce an indication providing an inventory of these factors were available against which judgement might be assessed.

The problem of wise usage of manpower presents equal opportunity for mature judgement in solution. Work simplification programs, and methods analysis reduce the requirement for manpower expenditures frequently, and quite often reduce the quality of manpower required to produce the desired results. The quality of work produced by manpower is often inferior to that produced by machine. The effect upon the morale of the workman is often devastating when he knows that the product of his efforts are inferior to results of other methods of available production, and equal effect is probable when he realizes that he is being employed below the limits of his capabilities.

It is admitted that the type of thinking herein projected is foreign to the training afforded the average officer or

petty officer. However, the average officer or petty officer is sympathetic to the implications of the thinking and can be trained towards desired objectives. The philosophy is radical deviation from that in universal employment, and changes as a result of this concept must be made gradually and in company with a program of education if the desired results are to be achieved.

VIII TRAINING OF SUBORDINATES TOWARD THE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT

The conversion of Heads of Departments, subordinate officers, and petty officers to the philosophy of management is not an insurmountable problem when one considers the general high intellectual level of the average sailor and further considers that there already exists a fair degree of expertness in any naval organization. On the average, officers and petty officers have been in the Navy for many years and have developed a great amount of "knowhow" in the execution of their everyday duties. Every officer and petty officer is susceptible to an active supervisory training program if the program is dressed with an attractive approach. Few commands have instituted such a program, but those which have done so have attained advantageous results.

Exercise of the full scope of delegated responsibility and corresponding authority develops men to the full limits of their capabilities faster than any other method, but active supervision by the commanding officer must be provided together with the recognition that mistakes are probable with those men previously unused to working out their own problems. The delegation must be accompanied by a skillfully constructed atmosphere of mutual confidence between the commanding officer and his subordinates, and an atmosphere of freedom in which the subordinate may act and express himself must be developed. In this atmosphere, supervisors are willing to listen to suggestions and there is an incentive provided to stimulate suggestions from them.

Ingenuity is required of the commanding officer in the conduct of his supervision, in order to preserve the atmosphere of freedom amongst those receiving his attention.

The institution of a supervisory training program results from a recognition of the need of training officers and supervisors in the field of human relationships, and recognizes the fact that the personnel of the ship are the most valuable asset of the command. The dynamics of behavior are not well understood in the naval service and the program which provides motivation rather than frustration is the program which will be enthusiastically received. Such training is of immediate benefit to both the individual and the Navy, and the results will magnify rather than reflect the effort placed in the conduct of the program.

IX MATERIAL MAINTAINANCE

A review of the management aspect of command afloat would be incomplete without citing the enormity of the responsibility of the commanding officer for the capital investment in the materiel which is assigned his command. The original capital investment in a destroyer is \$9,505,000 and the value of that investment is being constantly maintained and in some respects, improved. Replacement costs would be greatly in excess of those indicated in Table I at the relatively inflated costs of today's market. The attitude that the safeguarding of public property need not receive the same consideration and attention as the protection of one's private property indirectly grows from the lack of appreciation of the costs of public property. This attitude is not universal by any means, but it is observed with sufficient frequency as to assume the proportions of a major problem.

Maintainance of the ship and its equipment is a problem of tremendous importance from both economical and operational points of view. The success of the maintainance program is largely the result of the interest and attitude of the individual towards the portion of the ship for which he is responsible. The interest of the responsible sailor can be kept alive by assurance of complete understanding of the part which his machine or compartment plays in the performance of the command and the presence of a complete understanding of the results of low materiel

performance by his unit.

Tendencies to hoard supplies and expenditure of effort towards the maintenance of excess stocks of supplies and replacement parts must be discouraged in order to channel the entire efforts of available manpower into productiveness of consequence to the performance of the mission.

Since the standards of profit include the effective, economical and wise use of materiel as well as manpower, it is incumbent upon the commanding officer to examine the work programs of his command very carefully, and to assure himself of the continuous reflection of the command's actual materiel condition in the current ship's maintenance project files. As supervisors attain acceptable standards of utilization of manpower, they will simultaneously gain an appreciation for the proper, efficient, and economical usage of their equipment. As they develop a high standard of performance, an emotional acceptance of the standards of "profit" will become inherent, and immediate response to the implications of attained levels will become automatic.

X MORALE

The morale as an aspect of importance to the command function cannot be ignored. The commanding officer can set the policies. However, the commanding officer cannot maintain personal contact with every officer and sailor continuously and morale depends upon the kind and quality of contacts between the command as represented by the officers and petty officers on one hand and the sailor on the other. Morale is the summation of individual attitudes and the point of real contact and development of morale is at the level of first supervision.

In order to understand the problem of building morale, it is first necessary to understand the meaning of the word. The Winston Dictionary defines morale as "mental state, especially as regards zeal, determination, hope, devotion, and the like which may make a man or body of men capable of endurance and of persevering with courage in the presence of danger, fatigue, discouragement, etc.". Mr. Willard Parker summarizes his definition of morale as "Morale is the attitude held by the individual members of a group which makes them put achievement of the group goals ahead of achievement of personal goals".

Either of the cited definitions is acceptable, for they make the same point in different manners. There is no magic way to produce a high state of morale except hard work on the part of the commanding officer. It is he who sets the tone of the command.

In order for a high state of morale to exist, the sailor

must identify himself with the command, and build his ego upon a favorable relationship between his duty, ship, and shipmates. There are those who maintain that the state of morale is quantitatively measureable through factors such as the state of discipline; re-enlistment incidence; and venereal, neuropsychiatric, and sick rates. Whereas there is some degree of reliable indication possible by a coordination of these factors, the true measure of the status of morale must be found in the general attitude of the individual sailor.

The level of morale of a ship is indicated by the summation of the morale of the majority of the sailors in the command. The morale of the command is directly dependant upon the morale of each individual. Therefore, the problem of the commanding officer of maintenance and improvement of morale lay in the improvement of the morale of each individual in the group. Since the identity of the individual with the command is so largely dependant upon his daily contacts with his immediate supervisor or petty officer, it would appear that the efforts of morale improvement by the commanding officer should be at the level of the first line of supervision. This is an additional argument for the establishment of an effective supervisory training program within the command.

Much has been written, both within naval periodicals and in non-naval publications, on the general subject of building and maintenance of high morale levels. Methods of examination and suggestions as to procedures are numerous. Further ampli-

fication herein would serve no useful purpose. The commanding officer can and should avail himself of the opportunities provided in this field.

XI RECONCILIATION

The study of the various management aspects of command produces the conclusion that there is much more than similarity between Command Afloat and Top Management. It supports the conclusion that Command Afloat is Top Management. It would appear then that the officer assigned to such duty must adapt himself to the philosophy and manner of thinking of Top Management.

With the levels of manpower slowly advancing, the commanding officer can no longer depend upon peremptory orders to conduct the affairs of his command. He must substitute a leadership in which human-organizational relationships are recognized and in which delegation of responsibility is basic.

In the final analysis, it is the effectively managed crew of sailors that produces outstanding performances and makes the ship an effective unit of the fleet. Workload can be divided in accordance with the ability and fair-share of the burden, and the objective of the combined efforts can be well defined, but only the crew of the ship can achieve the goals. The wise commanding officer does everything possible to help his crew, and as little as possible to interfere with them.

Table I

RESTRICTEDCAPITALIZATION AND OPERATING COSTS OF TYPICAL SHIPS

<u>Capital Costs</u>	<u>2200 Ton Destroyer</u>	<u>122 Class Cruiser</u>	<u>AKA 1 - 20</u>	<u>LSD</u>
* Original contract price	\$6,793,000	\$27,042,000	\$4,240,000	\$5,945,000
* Original Cost inc.gov't.furnish- ed equipment and armament	9,505,000	41,052,000	4,669,000	6,545,000
* Design Tonnage	2,200	13,600	7,120	4,490
* Cost per design ton	\$ 4,300	\$ 3,000	\$ 650	\$ 1,450
<u>Operating Costs on Average, Annual, Basis</u>				
** Fuel, actual	\$ 126,156	\$ 268,121	\$ 81,114	\$ 115,980
* Alterations, estimate	150,000	175,000	75,000	200,000
* Repairs, estimate	125,000	170,000	135,000	120,000
* Misc.Supplies and Equipage, actual	120,800	154,000	50,000	60,000
¢ Subsistence actual	121,267	532,342	107,549	145,438
# Personnel costs, (pay, allowances and bedding) actual	827,795	3,511,679	951,915	873,824
# Training Ammunition Actual	248,540	843,447	66,069	86,337
# Restricted availabilities, estimated	41,000	66,000	33,000	33,000
Training and Education	?	?	?	?
### Total Operating	\$1,439,347	\$ 5,138,568	\$ unestimated	\$ unestimated

Sources:

- * Bureau of Ships, 16 Feb. 1953
- # Navy Comptroller, 1952 estimates
- ¢ Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, 23 Feb.1953, average for 1952
- ** " " " " , 17 Feb.1953, " " "
- ### Navy Comptroller, 1952 estimates: This does not represent arithmetic totals of various columns.

RESTRICTED

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THE

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